An Ideal Approach for Detection and Prevention of Phishing Attacks  by Shekokar, Narendra. M. et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  49 ( 2015 )  82 – 91 
1877-0509 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the 4th International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communication and 
Control (ICAC3’15)
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2015.04.230 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ICAC3’15 
AN IDEAL APPROACH FOR DETECTION AND PREVENTION 
OF PHISHING ATTACKS 
Narendra. M. Shekokar, Chaitali Shah, Mrunal Mahajan,Shruti Rachh* 
D. J. Sanghvi College of Engineering, Vile Parle(W), Mumbai:400056, India 
D. J. Sanghvi College of Engineering, Vile Parle(W), Mumbai:400056, India 
D. J. Sanghvi College of Engineering, Vile Parle(W), Mumbai:400056, India 
Abstract 
Phishing is a treacherous attempt to embezzle personal information such as bank account details, credit card information, 
social security number, employment details, and online shopping account passwords and so on from internet users. Phishing, or 
stealing of sensitive information on the web, has dealt a major blow to Internet security in recent times. These attacks use 
spurious emails or websites designed to fool users into divulging personal financial data by emulating the trusted brands of well-
known banks, e-commerce and credit card companies. 
In this paper, we propose a phishing detection and prevention approach combining URL-based and Webpage similarity based 
detection. URL-based phishing detection involves extraction of actual URL (to which the website is actually directed) and the 
visual URL (which is visible to the user). LinkGuard Algorithm is used to analyze the two URLs and finally depending on the 
result produced by the algorithm the procedure proceeds to the next phase. If phishing is not detected or Phishing possibility is 
predicted in URL-based detection, the algorithm proceeds to the visual similarity based detection. A novel technique to visually 
compare a suspicious page with the legitimate one is presented. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the 4th InternationalConference on Advances in Computing, 
Communication and Control (ICAC3’15). 
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1. Introduction 
Phishing is an online deceitful activity wherein the objective of an attacker is to plagiarize a victim’s sensitive 
information, such as online banking account details or social security number thus deceiving people into financial 
loss. Even though hoaxing people to make financial profit is an old idea, phishers have realized that social-
engineering based attacks are easy to execute and highly profitable over the Internet. 
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A typical phishing attack may be based on several techniques, including exploiting browser vulnerabilities or 
performing man-in-the-middle attacks using a proxy. However, the most straightforward and widespread method 
includes setting up a web page that is similar to the one which is known to the user. 
 
Therefore, although well known, phishing still poses a significant security threat and still a large number 
ofInternet users fall victim to this fraud. Furthermore, such attacks are not just causing troubles for Internet users, 
but also for companies that provide financial services online. This is because when users fall a prey to such phishing 
attacks, the organization providing the online service often suffers a loss in reputation as well as financial damage. 
2. Phishing attack procedure and prevention methods 
In this paper, we will consider methods to detect phishing that uses emails since phishers mostly use them to 
defraud the victims. The method is explained below: 
1) Phishers set up a phony Web site which looks identical to the legitimate Web site, including page layouts, 
styles(font families, sizes and so on), key regions, setting up the web server and applying the DNS server name. 
2) They send a huge number of fake emails to various users by spoofing as legitimate companies and organizations, 
trying to lure the potential victims to visit their Web sites.  
3) Victims who receive such emails, opens them, clicks on the hyperlink in the email which leads them to fake 
website created by the phisher, wherein they give in their significant personal information such as bank account 
passwords, credit card details and so on. 
4) Phishers embezzle such personal information and uses it for their own benefit such as stealing money from other 
people’s accounts. 
As per a study, it was found that 40% of the times, Internet users ignored browser-based cues such as the address 
bar and the security indicators. Some counterfeit websites are so similar to the legitimate websites that can fool even 
the most sophisticated users. As standard security indicators are not effective in preventing a large number of users 
from falling a victim to such phishing attacks, alternate approaches to avoid such attacks are needed. 
3. Related Work 
Phishing is a growing problem on the internet today for both consumers and businesses. One of the most common 
approaches for an attacker is to create a similar website in order to capture personal information from consumers. A 
malicious website may look identical to an online bank or other financial institution in order to capture passwords, 
social security numbers, account numbers, and other confidential information. A victim may not identify the 
malicious site until after the confidential information has been leaked.  
Some of the approaches for phishing detection are: 
3.1. Email-level approach 
This approach intends to amend the phishing attacksat the email level. The main concept is that when a spoofed 
email is not received by its victims, they cannot fall for the scam. Filters and content analysis techniques are often 
used to detectphishing emails before they can be delivered to users.For instance, by using training filters (e.g., 
Bayesianfilters), an enormous number of phishing emails can be thwarted. 
In order to prevent spoofing of sender information in an email message, Microsoft and Yahoo have defined email 
authentication protocols (Sender ID and DomainKeys) that can be used to verify the credibility of a received email. 
If widely used, these solutions could help to prevent spam emails and, as a result, decrease the number of email-
based phishing attacks. 
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3.2. Browser-integrated tool approach 
These toolsdetect phishing by comparing the web page link in the address bar with the list of malicious site URLs 
mentionedin a blacklist.For example, the address bar turns red in Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) 7 when a 
malicious page loads. Well-known, academic, browser-integrated solutions to slacken phishing attacks are 
SpoofGuard and PwdHash.  SpoofGuard works by analysingfor phishing symptoms such as obfuscated URLS in 
web pages. On the other hand, PwdHash generates domain-specific passwords that are rendered ineffectual when 
submitted to another domain. 
3.3. Webpage content analysis 
It analyzes a Web page’s content, such as the HTML code, text, images, input fields, forms and hyperlinks. 
Earlier, such content based approaches proved effective in detecting phishing pages. But recently, phishers have 
started creating web pages with non-HTML components, such as Flash objects, images and Java applets. For 
instance, a phisher might design a fake page that consists entirely of images, even if the original page contains only 
text information. In this case, content-based anti-phishing tools cannotanalyze the suspicious webpage because its 
HTML code contains nothing but HTML <img/>elements. 
3.4. Visual similarity based approach 
Liu et al.’s short paper suggests that authors define metrics by analysing and comparing legitimate and phishing 
web pageswhich can be used to detect a phishing page. The idea is to first disintegrate the web pages into pertinent 
blocks according to “visual cues.” Then, based on the defined metrics, similarity between two web pages is 
determined. If the resemblance to the legitimate web page is above the predefined threshold, then the web page is 
considered as a phishing page. 
4. Existing system 
Phishing has become a severe problem in the Internet society. Researchers have developed models and guidelines 
for supporting online consumer trust. Existing literature deals with trustworthiness ofwebsite interface designs and 
policies,website content and methods to foster customer relations. 
Table 1.Drawbacks in existing systems. 
Techniques False positives Zero day attacks Fake interface attack Slow response time  
Blacklist No Yes No No  
Heuristics Yes Maybe No Maybe  
User polling Yes Yes Yes Maybe  
Third-party certification No No Yes Maybe  
The techniques are described in detail below: 
4.1. Blacklist check 
The suspicious URL is compared with a list of malicious website links. This method is vulnerable to “zero day 
attacks”. In addition,this method does not work when techniques like routing through alternate domain nameand 
URL obfuscation are employed. 
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4.2. Heuristics  
It uses heuristics like domain registration information (owner, age, and country), the number of links to other 
known-good sites, image hashing, third-party cookies and user reviews. Most of the heuristics used are intuitive and 
leads to a large number of false positives. 
4.3. User polling 
It deems the URL as phished, based on user votes. However, it is ineffective against new phishing attacks and is 
very subjective. Our solution does not incorporate any kind of polling, thus reducing uncertainty. 
4.4. Working with third-party certification authorities and reputation services 
It requires an additional interface, which itself is susceptible to phishing. Phish detection in our solution is 
handled completely on the server side, without involving any third party service. Another technique is to use page 
rank methodology, domain analysis, URL type analysis, and word analysis, in order to detect a phishing URL. 
However, false positives have been observed in these methods. 
5. Our approach 
In the following subsection, we provide an overview of how our system can be used to detect phishing. Our 
system proposes a scheme for phishing page detection based on two phases: 
5.1. URL and DomainIdentity Verification[3] 
Normally, phishing is done via sending mails to thousands of users, urging them to visit the fake website through 
the link or URL present in it. In order to embezzle sensitive information from potential victims, phishers generally 
try to persuade the users to click on the hyperlink embedded in the spoofed email. A hyperlink has a structure as 
follows: 
<a href="URI"> Anchor text <\a> 
We have classified the hyperlinks used in the phishing email into the following categories: 
1) The hyperlink provides DNS domain names in the anchor text, but the destination DNS name in the visible link 
does not match as that in the actual link. For instance, the following hyperlink: 
<ahref=http://www.profusenet.net/checksession.php> https://secure.regionset.com/EBanking/logon/</a> 
The above hyperlink appears to be linked to secure.regionset.com, which is the portal of a bank, but it actually is 
linked to a phishing site www.profusenet.net. 
2) Dotteddecimal IP address is used directly in the URI or the anchor text instead of DNS name. For example, 
<a href= 
http://61.129.33.105/securedsite/www.skyfi.com/index.html?MfcISAPICommand=SignInFPP&UsingSSL=1> SIGN 
IN</a> 
3) The hyperlink is counterfeited maliciously by using certain encoding schemes. There are two cases:  
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a) The link is formed by encoding alphabets into their corresponding ASCII codes. Forexample, 
<a href=“http://%34%2E%33%34%2E%31%39%35% 
2E%34%31:%34%39%30%33/%6C%69%6E%64%65%78%2E%68%74%6D”> www.citibank.com </a> 
While this link seemed to point to www.citibank.com, it actually points to http://4.34.195.41:34/l/index.htm. 
b) Special characters (e.g. @ in the visible link) are used to fool the user to believe that the email is from a 
trusted sender. For instance, the following link seems is linked to amazon, but it actually is linked to IP 
address 69.10.142.34.  
http://www.amazon.com:fvthljhfcs83infoupdate@69.10.142.34 
4) The hyperlink does not provide destination information in its anchor text and uses DNS names in its URI. The 
DNS name in the URI usually is similar with a famous company or organization. For instance, the following 
link seems to be sent from paypal, but it actually is not. Since paypal-cgi is actually registered by the phisher to 
let the users believe that it has something to do with paypal. 
<a href=“http://www.paypal-cgi.us/webscr.php?cmd= LogIn”> Click here to confirm your  account </a> 
5) The attackers utilize the vulnerabilities of the target Web site to redirect users to their phishing sites or to launch 
CSS (cross site scripting) attacks. For example, the following link 
<a href=“http://usa.visa.com/track/dyredir.jsp?rDirl=http:// 200.251.251.11/.verified /”> Click here <a> 
Once the user clicks on the above link, it will redirect to the phishing site 200.251.251.11 due to a vulnerability of 
usa.visa.com. 
A phishing hyperlink can belong to several categories at the same time. For instance, an attacker may use tricks 
from both categories first and third at the same time to increase his success chance. 
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Fig. 1. System Architecture 
5.1.1. LinkGuard algorithm 
LinkGuard works by analyzing the differences between the visual link and the actual link. It also calculates the 
similarities of a URI with a known trusted site. The following terminologies are used in the algorithm. 
Nomenclature 
v_link  Visual linki.e. the link that is seen by the user 
a_link  Actual link i.e. the link to which user is redirected when clicked 
v_dns  Visual Domain Name System (DNS) name 
a_dns  Actual DNS name 
intLinkGuard (v_link, a_link)  
Step 1: v_dns = GetDNSName(v_link); 
Step 2:  a_dns = GetDNSName(a_link); 
Step 3:  if v_dns and a_dns are not empty and v_dns!=a_dns 
Step 3. 1.  return PHISHING and goto end  
Step 4:  if a_dns is dotted decimal 
Step 4.1.return POSSIBLE_PHISHING and goto next phase image based webpage matching 
Step 5: if a_linkor v_linkis encoded  
Step 5. 1.  v_link2= decode (v_link); 
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Step 5. 2. a_link2= decode (a_link); 
Step 5. 3.  returnLinkGuard(v_link2, a_link2); 
 /* Analyze the domain name for possible phishing */ 
Step 6:  if v_dnsis NULL 
Step 6. 1. returnAnalyzeDNS(a_link); 
Step 7: end 
The LinkGuardalgorithm works as follows. In its main routine LinkGuard, it first extracts the DNS names from 
the actual and the visual links (steps 1 and 2). It then compares the actual and visual DNS names, if these names are 
not the same, then it is phishing of category 1 (step 3). If dotted decimal IP address is directly used in actual dns, it 
is then a possible phishing attack of category 2 (step 4). If the actual link or the visual link is encoded (category 3), 
we first decode the links, then recursively call LinkGuardto return a result (step 5). When there is no destination 
information (DNS name or dotted IP address) in the visual link (categories 4 and 5), LinkGuard calls AnalyzeDNSto 
analyze the actual dns (step 6). LinkGuard therefore handles all the 5 categories of phishing attacks.  
intAnalyzeDNS (actual_link) 
/* Analyze the actual DNS name according to the blacklist and whitelist*/ 
Step 1: if actual_dns in blacklist 
Step 1. 1. return PHISHING goto end 
Step 2: if actual_dns in whitelist 
Step 2. 1. returnNOTPHISHING and goto next phase image based webpage matching 
Step 3:  return PatternMatching(actual_link); 
Step 4: end 
intPatternMatching(actual_link) 
Step 1: for each item prev_dns in seed_set 
Step 1. 1. bv = Similarity(prev_dns, actual_link); 
Step 1. 2. if (bv == true) 
Step 1. 1. 1. return POSSIBLE_PHISHING and goto next phase image based webpage   matching 
Step 1. 3. return NO_PHISHING and goto end 
Step 2: end 
float Similarity (str, actual_link)  
Step 1:  (str is part of actual_link) 
Step 1. 1. return true; 
Step 2: intmaxlen = the maximum string lengths of str and actual_dns; 
Step 3: intminchange = the minimum number of changes needed to transform str to actual_dns (or vice versa); 
Step 4: if (thresh<(maxlen-minchange)/maxlen<1) 
Step 4. 1.  return true 
Step 5: return false; 
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Step 6: end 
In AnalyzeDNS, if the actual dns name is contained in the blacklist, then we are sure that it is a phishing attack 
(step 1). Similarly, if the actual dns is contained in the whitelist, it is therefore not a phishing attack (step 2). If the 
actual dns is not contained in either whitelist or blacklist, PatternMatchingis then invoked (step 3). 
PatternMatchingis designed to handle unknown attacks (blacklist/whitelist is useless in this case). For category 5 
of the phishing attacks, all the information we have is the actual link from the hyperlink (since the visual link does 
not contain DNS or IP address of the destination site), which provide very little information for further analysis. In 
order to resolve this problem, we proactively collect DNS names that are manually input by the user when user surfs 
the Internet and store the names into a seed set, and since these names are input by the user by hand, we assume that 
these names are trustworthy. PatternMatching then checks if it is quite similar (but not identical) with one or more 
names in the seed set by invoking the Similarity procedure. 
Similarity checks the maximum likelihood of actual dns and the DNS names in seed set. The similarity index 
between two strings is determined by calculating the minimal number of changes (including insertion, deletion, or 
revision of a character in the string) needed to transform a string to the other string. If the number of changes is 0, 
then the two strings are identical; if the number of changes is small, then they are of high similarity; otherwise, they 
are of low similarity. For example, the similarity index of ‘microsoft’ and ‘micr0s0ft’ is 7/9 (since we need change 
the 2 ‘0’s in micr0s0ft to ‘o’. Similarly, the similarity index of ‘paypal’ and ‘paypal-cgi’ is 6/10 (since we need to 
remove the last 4 chars from paypal-cgi).  
Thus, LinkGuard algorithm analyzes the differences between the visual link and the actual link and also 
calculates the similarities of a URI with a known trusted site. If this algorithm detects possible or no phishing, then 
we perform the next phase i.e. image based webpage matching. 
5.2. Image-based web page matching 
We present a novel technique for comparing a suspicious web page snapshot with the legitimate one. The 
objective is to compute how similar the two web pages are. 
An important feature of a phishing webpage is its visual similarity to its target (true) webpage. Hence, a 
legitimate webpage owner or its agent can detect suspicious URLs and compare the corresponding web pages with 
the true one in visual aspects. If the visual similarity of a webpage to the true webpage is high, the owner will be 
alerted and can then take whatever actions to immediately prevent potential phishing attacks and hence protect its 
brand and reputation. Image based webpage matching is done as follows: 
We identify and consider the overall appearance of the entire page of the original website as well as the 
suspicious website in order to determine the similarity between them. 
5.2.1. Take the snapshot of the suspicious page and the original page 
This will either be done by using a browser plug-in for webpage snapshot or a code developed by us. This piece 
of code will take snapshot of the entire webpage. 
5.2.2. Compute Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) 
To compare these two snapshots, first we need to transform the image so that fewer comparisons are required. 
There are various transforms like DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform), DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform) and other 
techniques like Cross-correlation which can be used. We have chosen DCT as the initial transform to be performed 
on the images because of the following advantages over other transforms: 
• DCT is an accurate technique for image transformation. 
• Time complexity of DFT is O(N2) while Time Complexity of DCT is O(N log2N). 
• Cross-correlation is computationally complex and will take more number of operations to come to a result. 
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5.2.2.1. DCT 
The discrete cosine transform (DCT) helps
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of DCT matrix. 
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7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have proposed a phishing detection approach that increases the webpage security by checking 
the hyperlinks in the source code of the email webpage and the overall appearance of the website. Our method 
serves as the robust alternative to many high cost web security applications.We expect the detection results to be 
comparableto previously published work which would allow for newkinds of phishing warnings with better 
coverage, less falsepositives and explicit user recommendations how to avoidthese critical situations. 
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